By Dotan Rousso
Will Benjamin Netanyahu remain prime minister, or will Israelis choose a different leader?
Yet beneath this political drama lies a reality that many Western observers have failed to appreciate: regardless of who wins, Israel is no longer the country it was before October 7, 2023.
For decades, Western diplomacy has operated on the assumption that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can ultimately be resolved through negotiations, territorial compromises, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Today, however, this vision faces an extraordinary obstacle that extends far beyond Netanyahu and his government: the profound transformation of Israeli public opinion.
According to a Pew Research Center survey published in September 2026, only 17 per cent of Israelis believe that Israel and an independent Palestinian state can coexist peacefully, including just 16 per cent of Jewish Israelis. A majority of Israelis, 56 per cent, explicitly reject that possibility.
These findings reveal something more consequential than the popularity of any politician: a deep crisis of confidence in the prospects for peaceful coexistence.
October 7 exposed catastrophic failures in Israel’s intelligence and security systems while reinforcing fears about the dangers along its borders.
For many Israelis, the massacre demonstrated that territorial withdrawals and international guarantees cannot necessarily protect them against armed organizations committed to Israel’s destruction.
This does not mean that Israelis have abandoned their desire for peace, but rather that any proposed agreement must overcome profound public doubts about its security implications.
Consider Netanyahu and his prominent challenger, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot. Although they disagree sharply over political accountability, governance, West Bank settlement expansion, and the conduct of the war, both oppose Palestinian statehood under present circumstances and insist on overriding Israeli security control between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
Both seek the elimination of Hamas’s military capabilities, although their approaches to achieving that objective differ. This convergence challenges the expectation that replacing Netanyahu would automatically revive the traditional peace process.
This reality carries an important lesson for Canada, which formally recognized the State of Palestine in September 2025 and continues to advocate a two-state solution.
Canadian policymakers must recognize that replacing Netanyahu would not necessarily remove the principal obstacles to that vision. Israel’s security concerns cannot simply be dismissed as political excuses manufactured by one leader or political party, since they are deeply rooted, reinforced by traumatic experience, and shared across substantial portions of Israeli society.
Recognizing these concerns does not mean placing Israeli policies beyond criticism or disregarding Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. Any sustainable resolution must address the security and legitimate rights of both peoples, alongside the difficult questions surrounding Gaza, the West Bank, and the future of Palestinian governance.
Nevertheless, diplomatic initiatives that overlook the fears and political realities of the populations whose cooperation they require risk becoming exercises in wishful thinking.
Western governments may welcome a change of leadership in Jerusalem, but they should not mistake a change of government for a fundamental transformation of Israeli society.
Israelis may disagree profoundly about who should govern them, yet their reluctance to accept security arrangements they fear could expose their country to another October 7 extends well beyond traditional political divisions. Unless Western policymakers understand this distinction, they risk approaching Israel’s next government with expectations that political change alone cannot fulfill.