OP-ED: The Iran Bluff: Why a Strike on Tehran’s Nuclear Program Would Not Trigger Regional Collapse
Dr. Dotan Rousso writes: "As debates intensify over how to respond to Iran’s accelerating nuclear program, a familiar narrative echoes through policy circles and media outlets—even here in Canada."
Author: Dr. Dotan Rousso
As debates intensify over how to respond to Iran’s accelerating nuclear program, a familiar narrative echoes through policy circles and media outlets—even here in Canada: that any Israeli or American strike on Iranian nuclear sites would “ignite the Middle East” or “devastate the region.” This fear-driven analysis, however, no longer reflects today’s realities. In fact, it may be dangerously outdated.
Iran in 2025 is not the regional powerhouse it once aspired to be. Its strategic allies are fractured, weakened, or unwilling to act. Syria is consumed by internal decay and shows no intention of being drawn into a war it cannot win. Hezbollah, the much-hyped Lebanese proxy, has been significantly degraded by sustained Israeli military pressure. Its arsenal is far smaller than it once was, and its leadership ranks have been repeatedly targeted. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, once key partners of Iran, are in survival mode in Gaza, unable to coordinate or launch major offensives.
The “Axis of Resistance,” long described as a geopolitical nightmare for Israel and the West, is in fact falling apart.
If Israel and the United States do decide to act militarily to stop Iran’s nuclear program, the assumption that Iran can retaliate in any meaningful, sustained way is—at best—exaggerated. Iran possesses a large ballistic missile program, yes. But Israel has spent decades building a highly effective missile defense system precisely to counter this threat. Likewise, U.S. assets in the region are prepared for asymmetric retaliation. Some damage may occur—but the notion of “devastation” is misplaced.
Iran’s air force is negligible. It cannot reach Israel or American forces directly. It has no credible ground invasion capability. And it has no land bridge or regional force with the capacity to engage in a conventional campaign against its enemies.
What’s left in its toolkit? A cyberattack or two. Some propaganda. A few terror plots abroad. Possibly Houthi harassment in the Red Sea or token strikes from remaining Shi’a militias in Iraq. These are tactical irritants—not strategic game-changers.
Canadian policy analysts should pay close attention here. Much of the commentary in Western media, including in Canada, still clings to the mythology of a united, powerful Iranian-led coalition ready to engulf the region in fire if provoked. That simply isn’t the case anymore.
More importantly, the long-standing fear of escalation has led to a policy of restraint that has only emboldened Tehran. If Iran senses that its nuclear sites are off-limits because the West is too timid to act, it will continue its march toward a nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed Iran, not a retaliatory missile barrage, is the true long-term threat to regional and global stability.
For Canadian foreign policy, this has direct implications. Canada has consistently supported nuclear non-proliferation, regional stability, and the safety of its allies. We are part of the global effort to deter nuclear escalation. If and when Israel and the United States act, we should understand the context: it is a preemptive move based on hard intelligence and a deteriorating status quo—not a reckless provocation.
Let’s stop repeating the tired warnings of “regional collapse.” Iran is isolated. Its proxies are broken. And its capacity for meaningful retaliation is minimal. To pretend otherwise is not strategic prudence—it is strategic paralysis.