Author: Harry Margulies
Alberta has voted against starting a process to separate from Canada. Meanwhile, Quebec has elected a Parti Québécois minority government whose leader remains committed to an independence referendum, apparently waiting for better odds.
Quebecers have already voted twice on independence, in 1980 and 1995. Both proposals were defeated.
Why shouldn’t Canada establish the principles for negotiating Quebec’s departure before Quebecers vote on leaving? Just adopting the Quebec sovereigntist playbook.
Parliament should establish an independent commission to examine the consequences of separation and recommend Canada’s negotiating principles before another referendum.
Shortly after I arrived in Canada in 1982, a banker illustrated the sovereigntist negotiating strategy. A guest is sitting in your home late at night.
“It’s getting late. I really must go,” says the guest.
Host: “Please stay a little longer.”
Guest: “Yes, but only if you serve the best champagne.”
Quebec is not a guest in somebody else’s house. But the story captures an uncomfortable question: how often should one side offer more to keep the other from leaving?
Quebec sovereigntists have every right to argue for independence. But repeatedly voting until they obtain a mandate to leave is not the same as understanding the consequences. Nor should Canada negotiate those consequences without first considering what it is prepared to accept.
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Quebec could not unilaterally separate. A clear majority supporting independence on a clear question would create a constitutional duty to negotiate, not automatic separation.
Parliament passed the Clarity Act in 2000, setting requirements for a clear referendum question and a clear majority. But it does not establish Canada’s negotiating position on debt, territory, pensions or other consequences.
An independent commission could examine these issues and recommend a framework. Parliament could then debate its recommendations and establish Ottawa’s starting position, informed by Canadians across the country, including Quebecers.
This would not replace Quebec’s referendum or give the rest of Canada a veto. Nor would it predetermine the outcome. Some issues could only be settled through negotiations involving Quebec and other affected parties.
What, then, should the commission examine? Seven fundamental questions deserve consideration.
1. Debt and assets: How should Quebec assume its fair share of federal debt and receive a corresponding share of federal assets? Should population determine both, and what happens if people leave Quebec during negotiations?
2. Territory and borders: Should all territory within Quebec automatically become part of an independent country? What about the enormous northern territories transferred to Quebec in 1898 and 1912? These territories were transferred within the Canadian federation. Had separation been contemplated, would the transfers have taken place on the same terms?
3. Indigenous rights: What rights should the Cree, Inuit and other Indigenous communities have in determining their future? In separate northern votes during the 1995 sovereignty debate, approximately 96 per cent of Cree and Inuit voters rejected separation. Their wishes cannot be ignored.
4. Municipalities and minority rights: If Quebec claims a democratic right to leave Canada, should communities wishing to remain Canadian have their wishes considered? Quebec cannot reasonably insist on its own territorial integrity while challenging Canada’s.
5. Trade and transit: Should Quebec guarantee unrestricted road and rail transit between Ontario and Atlantic Canada? Should Canada guarantee Quebec access to the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic coasts? What arrangements would govern trade and residence?
6. Citizenship and pensions: Would Quebec establish its own citizenship? What would happen to Canadian citizenship, existing pension entitlements and people wishing to retain their Canadian connections?
7. Currency: If Quebec continues using the Canadian dollar, should it have any say in Bank of Canada monetary policy? Any special arrangement would have to be negotiated.
The commission would also have to consider federal transfers, taxation, international agreements, defence commitments and financial stability. I am not suggesting that every municipality can declare independence or that northern Quebec automatically reverts to Canada. These are difficult constitutional and political questions that deserve serious examination.
There is another compelling reason to act in advance: economic uncertainty.
Negotiations could take years, and investors dislike uncertainty. Companies might postpone investments or move elsewhere. Capital could leave, employment suffer and confidence deteriorate. Waiting until after a successful independence referendum to establish Canada’s negotiating position could add another layer of uncertainty at precisely the wrong time.
Sovereigntists may believe the threat of independence gives Quebec leverage over Canada. Separation would certainly hurt Canada’s economy. But they should not assume Canada would suffer more than Quebec.
Investors seeking predictable surroundings could find Quebec’s uncertainty particularly troubling. Quebec might find that the economic cost of threatening separation outweighs the political leverage it generates.
Canada would face consequences, too. The United States, its largest trading partner, would have to consider trade agreements, border arrangements and continental security if it suddenly found itself dealing with two countries instead of one.
Would establishing Canada’s negotiating principles beforehand create uncertainty of its own? Possibly. Canadians could disagree, and Quebec might reject Ottawa’s positions. But those disagreements already exist. Postponing them would mean confronting them during negotiations, when political pressure and economic uncertainty could make agreement even harder.
There is a fundamental difference between debating negotiating principles while Canada remains intact and trying to establish them after a vote to break up the country. In the first case, Canadians have time to consider the issues calmly. In the second, Ottawa could find itself responding to events rather than negotiating from an established position. An independent commission and parliamentary debate would not eliminate uncertainty or guarantee a settlement.
Quebecers, too, deserve to understand what independence could mean for their citizenship, pensions, savings, businesses, property and access to Canadian markets. Those consequences should be part of the debate before they vote, not surprises that emerge afterward.
If Quebec ultimately chooses independence through a lawful constitutional process, it should remain Canada’s neighbour, trading partner and friend.
But before anyone opens the champagne, perhaps Canadians should agree on who owns the house, who gets which rooms, who assumes the mortgage and whether the departing guest gets to take the garden too.
And this time, let’s discuss the arrangements before the party begins.
Harry Margulies is an author, commentator and international tax advisor whose work spans economics, taxation, religion and public policy. A former international tax consultant with experience advising governments and institutions, he now writes and speaks on the relationship between policy, belief and institutional power.



