CHARLEBOIS: Mr. Carney, which trade deal strategy is it this week?
Dr. Sylvain Charlebois writes, "Under Mark Carney, Canada’s posture toward the United States has shifted with surprising speed."
By: Sylvain Charlebois
Sylvain Charlebois is director of the Agri-Food Analytics Lab at Dalhousie University, co-host of The Food Professor Podcast and visiting scholar at McGill University.
There is something almost too convenient in how quickly Canadians point south when discussing unpredictability in trade. Yes, Donald Trump has long been synonymous with volatility. But focusing solely on Washington risks missing a more uncomfortable truth: Ottawa has become just as difficult to read.
Under Mark Carney, Canada’s posture toward the United States has shifted with surprising speed—less theatrical than Trump’s, but no less consequential. In April 2025, we were promised a renewed economic and security partnership. By the summer, we were told the existing deal was already the best possible outcome. Fast forward to April 2026, and suddenly our reliance on the U.S. is framed as a strategic weakness. All of this, notably, after months without meaningful engagement or negotiation.
That messaging matters. Especially when delivered in a widely viewed address, suggesting that CUSMA—the backbone of North American trade—is somehow on life support. It leaves industry asking a basic question: what exactly is the plan?
The revival of a Trudeau-era advisory council might suggest renewed seriousness. And to be fair, its composition is more balanced than critics might assume. Figures like Ken Seitz and Michael Harvey bring genuine expertise in fertilizers and agricultural trade—critical inputs for food production. Others offer adjacent perspectives: Jean Simard understands packaging and processing supply chains; Jonathan Price connects to resource extraction essential for fertilizer inputs; and P. J. Akeeagok brings a grounded view of food security in remote regions.
This is not an absence of agri-food knowledge. It is, however, an indirect one.
What is missing is arguably more important: primary producers. Farmers. Western Canadian voices. Those operating at the very front lines of production. In a sector that is geographically vast and structurally complex, that omission is not trivial—it is strategic.
And strategy is precisely what Canada lacks right now.
For an agri-food sector that sends roughly 75% of its exports to the United States, policy ambiguity is not an academic concern—it is a business risk. Increasingly, companies are not waiting for clarity. They are hiring consultants, restructuring supply chains, and preparing for a post-CUSMA environment. Not because it is inevitable, but because it is conceivable.
That alone should raise alarms.
While Canada debates its posture, Mexico is moving decisively—and intelligently. Under socialist Claudia Sheinbaum, the Mexican government has demonstrated a level of strategic discipline that Canada would do well to study. Despite repeated provocations—from being labelled a “narco-president,” to symbolic disputes like the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico, to the ever-present rhetoric around border walls—Mexico has largely refused to take the bait.
Instead of reacting to the noise, it has stayed focused on the signal: trade, production, and integration.
That approach has paid off. Mexico did not escalate. It did not grandstand. It did not reframe the partnership as a liability. It simply continued to deepen its role within the North American economy. And in doing so, it has strengthened its position as the United States’ most reliable agricultural and manufacturing partner.
The result? Mexico is no longer just a participant in continental trade—it is becoming central to it. It is positioning itself as America’s fresh food basket, a year-round agricultural partner, and a seamless extension of the U.S. logistics and supply chain system.
Meanwhile, Canada risks drifting into a narrower role: a bulk commodity supplier with diminishing influence over consumer-facing markets.
The contrast is striking. The U.S.–Mexico relationship is not without friction, but it is fundamentally aligned. Disputes happen within the partnership—not about its existence. Supply chains are being integrated, not questioned. The direction of travel is clear.
Canada’s is not. And that is the real problem.
Trade relationships do not unravel overnight. They erode gradually—through hesitation, mixed messaging, and missed opportunities. What we are witnessing today is not a collapse, but a slow decoupling of strategic intent.
For a country whose prosperity is so tightly linked to cross-border trade, particularly in food, that is a risk we can ill afford.
Because in the end, markets reward certainty. And right now, Canada is offering anything but.
Carney does not want a deal. This committee is just so the Liberal voters will think that he's doing something regarding the trade deal. As has been said in other articles, Carney's stance on the US is not what he truly believes. His wife and two daughters live there. If the US is so bad, why is that? Carney moved Brookfield's head office there and 90% of his investments are in the US. Why is that?
He is trying to keep the Liberal voters angry at Trump so that he can justify not dealing with them while he makes money for himself and his buddies with his green climate stuff. This will result in a further decline in Canada's economy. When people finally see this destruction to Canada and Carney is out as PM, he will go to the US or Europe. He does not care about Canada. He has only wanted the power and ability to use the taxpayer's money to make himself rich.
“Meanwhile, Canada risks drifting into a narrower role: a bulk commodity supplier with diminishing influence over consumer-facing markets.”
Likely worse than a bulk supplier of anything that does not meet the toxic green carney liberal narrative.
What is the narrative this week, next week, next month! New committees solve nothing.