Author: Sergio R. Karas
Two recent cases illustrate the stakes in Canada’s immigration security system.
In July 2024, the RCMP charged Ahmed Eldidi and his son, Mostafa Eldidi, with terrorism offences in connection with an alleged ISIS-inspired attack in Toronto.
Ahmed Eldidi had entered Canada as a visitor in 2018, claimed refugee protection, became a permanent resident, and obtained citizenship before Canadian authorities reportedly became aware of a video that allegedly connected him to ISIS.
Both men are presumed innocent; the charges have not been proven in court. But the federal chronology prepared for Parliament confirmed that security screening occurred at several stages and that the potential national security threat emerged only in June 2024.
In September 2024, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, a Pakistani national studying in Canada, was arrested over an alleged ISIS-inspired plan to attack Jewish people in New York. That case, too, involves allegations rather than a conviction.
Nevertheless, it raises a legitimate question: did relevant concerns exist before entry, did they develop afterwards, or was useful intelligence simply unavailable until law-enforcement agencies intervened?
These incidents do not establish that international students, workers, or visitors generally pose a security threat. Millions enter Canada lawfully and contribute to the country. Isolated prosecutions should never become a pretext for treating people as suspicious because of their nationality, religion, or ethnicity.
But neither should Ottawa dismiss documented failures as unfortunate anomalies.
Canada already has substantial legal authority. Section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act makes foreign nationals and permanent residents inadmissible for terrorism, espionage, subversion, threats to Canada’s security and membership in organizations engaged in those activities. Criminality, organized crime, human rights violations, and misrepresentation are addressed elsewhere in the Act.
The screening system is also more sophisticated than many Canadians realize.
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada performs the initial screening of temporary and permanent residence applications. Files presenting security indicators may be referred to the Canada Border Services Agency and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service for more comprehensive review. Biometric information can be checked against Canadian records and exchanged with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
Most applicants for visitor visas, work permits, and study permits must provide fingerprints and a photograph. Those biometrics can expose the use of aliases, borrowed documents, or undisclosed criminal records. IRCC collected biometrics from more than 3.5 million applicants in 2024.
Yet an immigration security system is only as dependable as the information available to it. A fingerprint search cannot reveal conduct that was never recorded. A police certificate is of limited value if the issuing state’s records are incomplete, inaccessible, or corrupt. A database check cannot find an unknown suspect. And an automated risk indicator cannot replace an experienced officer asking questions about unexplained travel, conflicting employment histories, or questionable documents.
There are also identifiable gaps. Visa-exempt travellers who enter by air with an electronic travel authorization generally do not provide fingerprints or photographs in advance.
IRCC itself has proposed collecting facial biometrics from eTA applicants to address what it describes as identity-management gaps. That reform should proceed, accompanied by passport authentication, limits on data retention, and independent privacy oversight.
Official reviews provide a stronger case for reform than headlines alone. A CBSA evaluation of the Immigration National Security Screening Program found limited performance measurement, inconsistent use of referral indicators across geographic desks, outdated country information, and insufficient surge capacity. It recommended better tracking, interdepartmental training, and controls to ensure that cases requiring comprehensive screening are actually referred.
The international student program reveals a related detection-to-enforcement problem.
Between December 2023 and September 2025, officials assessed more than 841,000 letters of acceptance. More than 12,000 were flagged for potential fraud, and thousands more had been cancelled by the issuing institution or required manual review.
The Auditor General’s March 2026 findings were more troubling. IRCC identified more than 153,000 students as potentially non-compliant during 2023 and 2024 but had funding to investigate only 2,000 cases annually. Officials also identified 800 study permits issued based on fraudulent documentation or misrepresentation. Most of those individuals subsequently sought another form of immigration status.
Potential non-compliance is not terrorism, and a fraud indicator is not proof of misconduct. But the figures show a broader institutional weakness: Canada is increasingly capable of generating alerts without having sufficient capacity to investigate and resolve them.
Ottawa should make five practical changes.
First, assign end-to-end accountability. IRCC, CBSA, CSIS, and the RCMP need a shared case record and a clearly identified operational lead for serious files. When one agency receives material intelligence, it should not depend on informal communication or incompatible systems for that information to reach the others.
Second, strengthen pre-arrival identity and document verification. Digital passport authentication, biometric comparison, and direct confirmation of educational, employment and civil-status documents should be standard when objective indicators justify closer examination.
Third, restore targeted human scrutiny. Applicants with material inconsistencies, unverifiable histories or credible links to terrorism, organized crime, sanction evasion, transnational repression, or foreign interference networks should normally receive a structured interview. The purpose is not to presume inadmissibility, but to evaluate information that paper processing cannot adequately verify.
Fourth, reassess risk when new information emerges. Security screening cannot always be a one-time snapshot. A fresh permit application, permanent residence decision or citizenship grant should trigger proportionate rechecking against current intelligence and law enforcement information — particularly where an earlier concern was unresolved. Adverse action must still be based on the individual record, with reasons and a meaningful opportunity to respond where required by law.
Finally, fund enforcement and publish results. Parliament should receive aggregate reporting on referrals, completed security screenings, processing times, fraud investigations, and enforcement outcomes. Automated tools should assist triage, not make final decisions. False positives, demographic bias, and improper data use must be independently audited.
The choice is not between open borders and collective suspicion. It is between opaque, fragmented screening and an accountable system capable of distinguishing legitimate applicants from the small number who present a genuine risk.
Canada should remain welcoming. But welcome must rest on verified identity, reliable information, and the ability to act when credible concerns arise. Security and fairness are not competing principles. Properly designed, each protects the other.
Sergio R. Karas, principal of Karas Immigration Law Professional Corporation, is a specialist in Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Law certified by the Law Society of Ontario, Division Chair of the ABA International Law Section, past chair of the Ontario Bar Association Citizenship and Immigration Section, past chair of the International Bar Association Immigration and Nationality Committee, and a fellow of the American Bar Foundation.
"Canada’s temporary entry system needs a security reset"
Just a slight change:
Canada’s temporary entry system needs an enema.
So does Conman Carney and his entire gang of trained seals and traitors.